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Abstract
This paper presents an empirical assessment of the relevance of different factors when 
understanding preferences for outcome-egalitarian policies in health, in particular 
respondent age and sex. A representative sample of the Spanish population was 
interviewed (n=1,209). After b ing informed that those from the higher social class have 
longer life expectancy at birth than those from the lower social class, respondents were 
required to choose between two programmes: to increase life expectancy of the two 
groups by the same amount (the “distribution neutral” programme); and to target the 
lowest social class group, thereby reducing current health inequalities (the “targeting” or 
“egalitarian” programme). Two variants, one with and the other without visual aid, are 
used. Majority (69%) of respondents support targeting. An effect of age was observed, 
where younger and older individuals are less likely to target the egalitarian policy than 
those in middle age. However, individual’s sex was not associated with targeting 
behaviour. In addition, right-wingers or/and individuals living in a high per capita income 
region are less likely to target. On the other hand, neither individual’s education nor 
household income has a significant impact on targeting. Finally, regarding the two 
variants, results suggest that the visual aid is associated with less targeting.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Maximising average population health is a major objective of public health care systems. 
However, modern health care systems have another objective: equality in the distribution 
of health. Various studies have explored how members of the public see the balance 
between these two objectives (see for example Johannesson & Gerdtham, 1996; Anderson 
& Lyttkens, 1998; Cuadras-Morato et al. 2001; Dolan & Robinson, 2001; Dolan et al, 
2002; Abásolo & Tsuchiya 2004). A common feature of most studies is that neither 
maximisation nor equalisation of health alone is supported.  However, what has been 
rarely investigated so far is what makes some people more egalitarian than others in 
health, that is, what factors determine preferences for egalitarian policies in health. An 
exception is Lindholm et al (1997), which found that support for different interpretations 
of equity in health is strongly associated with the respondent’s sex and political affiliation: 
women, and those who support political parties on the left have relatively more 
sympathies towards equity.  Another related study is the one of Hudson and Jones (2002) 
that shows with UK data that self-interest attitudes (together with public-interest attitudes) 
have a significant effect on preferences related to redistributive policies in health. In 
addition, the impact of age and education is such that as people get older and/or more 
educated they are less averse to higher taxes for health policy purposes.
Studies on people’s attitudes and motivations outside the health economics literature have 
looked at attitudes over income inequalities, collective action, or moral and political 
orientation in general. Mainstream economics literature has assumed that self-interested 
preferences play a strong role in determining individual’s attitudes towards income 
inequalities, as a direct consequence of the standard economic public choice argument of 
the self-interested median voter hypothesis (Romer 1975, Meltzer & Richards 1981).  
Bénabou & Ok (2001) has shown using an intergenerational model how the preferences of 
those with below average income to oppose redistributive policies can be consistent with 
self interest, if they expect to raise above mean income in the future, or the “prospect of 
upward mobility (POUM)” hypothesis (also see Ohtake and Tomioka, 2004; Fong, 2001), 
which has implications for the effect of age on such preferences. In their studies of the 
determinants of charitable donations in Canada, Kitchen & Dalton (1990) and Kitchen 
(1992), show that family wealth and age of the household tend to be significant 
determinants of charitable giving. 
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In addition to age, and going beyond self-interest, the effect of gender in moral and 
political orientation has been subject of analysis in a number of empirical studies. Beutel 
& Marini (1995) find that women are more likely than men to display group solidarity. 
Similarly, Davies (1983) shows that women display a greater ability to see things form the 
perspective of others. Gilligan (1993) shows that while men tend to base their moral 
arguments on concepts of justice and rights, women tend to appeal to notions of care and 
to a desire to minimise harm to others. However, Jaffee & Hyde (2000) found evidence 
that do not offer support the claim that care orientation is used by women and justice 
orientation is used predominantly by men. Other researchers show that females support 
more policies like public protection, ‘compassion’ issues and traditional values (Shapiro & 
Hanajan, 1986). Eckel & Grossman (1998) in their exploration of basic gender differences 
in economic behaviour show that women are more socially-orientated (selfless) and men 
more individually-orientated (selfish).  
Finally, another interesting point raised in the literature is that people may prefer more 
redistribution to the poor if they believe that poverty is caused by circumstances beyond 
individual control. This implies a social perspective on distributive justice rather than 
(only) self-motivated preferences (see for example Fong, 2001; Charness & Rabin, 2002; 
Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002). 
The motivation of this paper is to explore what factors can help us to understand social 
preferences for egalitarian policies in health in particular respondent age and sex. In 
addition, we will consider other factors that we anticipate to be relevant. To account for 
possible self-interest we will consider household income and education as proxies to 
capture that potential effect. We will also consider other controls such ideology or region 
of residence. Finally, the effect of framing the same question on responses and its 
interaction with respondent characteristics are investigated. Results from a survey in Spain 
that includes questions on preferences to reduce inequalities in health are used for this 
analysis (see Abasolo et al. 2001).
First, respondents were informed of a current health inequality across socio-economic 
groups, namely, that men from the highest social class have a longer life expectancy at 
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birth (75 years) than men from the lowest social class (70 years)1. Then, respondents were 
asked to choose between two health programmes with the same cost: programme A, that 
extends the life expectancy of both these population groups by two years each (the 
“distribution neutral” programme), and programme B, that targets the disadvantaged group 
and increases their life expectancy by four years.  Since, by targeting all the benefits to the 
disadvantaged group, programme B will reduce the inequality by the same amount, we 
will refer to this as the “targeting programme” or the “egalitarian programme”.  The aim 
of the questionnaire was to tap into the preferences of the respondent as a citizen, 
comparing public policies addressing issues of inequality and distribution, as opposed to a 
consumer, purchasing insurance policies for their own benefit.  The survey question 
continued to identify the strength of inequality aversion by subjecting those respondents 
who choose the egalitarian policy to explicit trade offs between efficiency and equality; 
however, the present paper concentrates on the first exercise alone, where it is assumed 
that both programmes are equally efficient.  At the end of the survey, socio-economic, 
demographic and ideological information were gathered to serve as the explanatory 
variables.  Two different ways of presenting the options were used (a Pictorial variant and 
a Verbal variant), with the aim of testing whether or not these two different devices to 
present the same information lead to the same results.
II.  THE MODEL AND ESTIMATION METHODS  
We specify a model that explains the probability of a given respondent to target the 
disadvantaged group, as defined above. An underlying (or latent) variable ( *T ) represents 
an individual’s propensity to choose this policy. We anticipate that demographic, socio-
economic and ideological characteristics are associated with people’s attitudes towards 
egalitarianism. With respect to the first, age (A) and gender (G) are considered. Secondly, 
since we are dealing with attitudes regarding socio-economic inequalities, we may expect 
there to be some pattern in the responses by respondents’ socio-economic status; proxies 
used to explore this possibility are household income (Y), education (E), per capita income 
1
 The data are based on those for England (Acheson, 1998). Available data on life expectancy at age 25 by 
education groups in Madrid and Barcelona show similar patterns (Borrel et al. 1999).
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of the region of residence (R), and being in the labour market (L)2. In general, it is 
expected that all these variables are negatively related with the propensity to support the 
egalitarian health policy. Thirdly, political affiliation, or ideology (I), is also assumed to 
have a role in the model. After all, people’s attitude towards egalitarianism is an 
ideological issue, which might be favoured more by a left wing person. Lastly, we include 
in the model another variable (Q) representing the questionnaire variant. The question 
could be presented to the respondents with the aid of pictures (P) or verbally with no 
visual aids (V).  The aim of this regressor in the model is to determine whether there are 
significant differences in the estimated probabilities depending on the way the question is 
asked.  
Thus, the model can be written as: 
In model [eq.1], the i subscripts represent individual respondents, and i captures 
influences unobserved by the analyst, which we assume to have a standard normal 
distribution with zero mean and constant variance. In practice, *T is unobserved. Rather, 
we observe Ti, which is a dummy variable representing whether or not the individual 
actually chooses the targeting policy; therefore it is the realization of a binomial process 
defined by:
                                                                 Ti = 1 if [ *iT > 0]                 
So, if the individual’s propensity to target is positive ( *iT > 0) s/he will choose the 
egalitarian policy (Ti  = 1), and if otherwise  ( *iT  0) s/he will not (Ti  = 0). 
2
 An additional variable “social class” was also available in the data set. However it was not used in this 
study due to two reasons. Firstly, because the definition of social class is not explicitly given (the respondent 
is simply asked whether s/he belongs to high, middle-high, middle, middle-low or low social class). So there 
is no correspondence at all with social class I and V referred in the main question. Actually 60% self-
reported to belong to middle social class. Secondly, there is no correlation between the “social class” 
variable and other variables representative of socio-economic status such as education or family income.  
[eq. 1]iQiRiIiLiYiEiAiGiTTi += ),,,,,,,(*
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In order to select the functional form of the empirical model, socio-economic and 
statistical criteria are used. This has allowed us to consider the definitions of the set of 
dummy variables and whether the only continuous variable (age) enters the model in 
natural units, as logarithms or as higher-order powers. Interactions between regressors are 
also included and tested in the model. In particular, in order to test whether the mode of 
presenting the question (P or V) has a different effect on the propensity to target across the 
different background characteristics specified in the model, we will test the joint 
hypothesis that the interactions of Q with the rest of regressors are not significantly 
different from zero. 
The estimation process will be undertaken through non-linear probit regressions. 
Likelihood ratio (LR) tests and Reset specification tests will be carried out to appraise the 
appropriateness of the different functional forms. Throughout, a 5% significance level is 
used. 
Estimations of model [eq.1] will allow us to empirically assess the relevance of the 
different hypothesised explanatory variables and appraise whether the way in which the 
question is formulated does not account or it does, and if it does in which way.  
Model [eq.1] may be subject to selection bias due to incomplete survey data. In surveys of 
this sort respondents do not always provide answers to all the questions of the survey. It is 
the so-called “item non-response”. If the pattern of non-response is not at random, 
conventional estimators may be biased and inconsistent. Tests for selection bias and 
correction, if necessary, are undertaken estimating a probit with sample selection (Greene
1997). The probit with sample selection works in a manner very similar to the Heckman 
model except that the response variable is binary. This method requires additional 
exogenous variables (or identifying variables), which should explain the probability of 
participating but have no direct impact on the probability to target.
So, let us assume an underlying (unobserved) variable *iY  that determines selection into 
participating groups, i.e. Yi = 1 when *iY > threshold, and Yi = 0 when 
*
iY  threshold. *iY
would represent the inclination for the individual to participate answering all the relevant 
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7
questions being *iY a linear function of some of the exogenous variables in model [eq.1] as 
well as some identifying variables as follows: 
The identifying variables include Mi, which represents the marital status of the individual 
(married, single, divorced or widow), and Hi, which represents whether the individual 
lives in a rural area. The main criteria used here for proposing both set of identifying 
variables are that the variables have an impact on the probability to participate but are 
unrelated to the individual’s preference for egalitarian policies. ui is a random error term 
normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance.  
Selection bias occurs when there is correlation between Y and  (and therefore between 
and u); that is, when unobservable factors that influence the potentially selection are also 
influencing the probability to target. If so, selection bias will be corrected. To check 
whether selection bias is absent we will test, firstly, whether  (the correlation of 
residuals) is significantly different from zero: if the covariance between  and u is 
significantly different from zero, then we cannot reject that there is no selection bias. In 
addition, a comparison of the estimates of both the initial probit and the probit with 
selection is undertaken: a large change in the coefficients, a change of the sign of the 
coefficients or a change in the statistical significance of the coefficients between the initial 
probit and the probit with selection indicate the existence of selection bias. 
III. DATA AND VARIABLES DEFINITION
The data were collected during 1999 in Spain. A survey of 1,209 individuals over 18 years 
of age was undertaken. Face to face interviews were assigned across the 17 “Comunidades 
Autónomas” (“Regions” for short), reflecting the local resident population proportionally. 
Within each of the Regions, interviews were randomly allocated so that the achieved 
sample will be representative of the general Spanish population in terms of socio-
demographic characteristics. Each of the two variants of the questionnaire was 
uiHiMiRiLiAiGiYYi += ),,,,,(* [eq. 2]
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8
administered to approximately the same number of respondents: 602 for the P-variant and 
607 for the V-variant.  In terms of background characteristics, the distribution of these 
variables across the two variants is not statistically significantly different from each other.
The binary dependent variable, target, takes the value 1 if individual i targets the worse 
off group, 0 if otherwise. Age is a continuous variable, which takes values between 18 and 
94, and also enters the equation in quadratics. The binary variable female indicates 
whether the individual is female or male. Education is recorded by level of schooling and 
has been categorised in three dummy variables representing low education lowedu (those 
with primary school education or less), middle education midedu (those with secondary 
school education, the baseline category), and high education highedu (those with higher 
and university education). Household income is also categorised in three dummies high 
income (more than 1,653 euros per month), middle income (between 600 and 1,653 euros 
per month, the baseline category) and low income (less than 600 euros per month)3. Per 
capita income in the region of residence is captured by three dummies: high income 
regions highreg (those resident in Madrid, Navarra or País Vasco), low income regions 
lowreg (those who live in Andalucia or Extremadura) and middle income regions midreg 
(residents in the rest of Spain, the omitted category). The binary variable non-labour 
market (nonlabmkt) indicates whether the individual is not currently in the labour market 
(i.e. is retired, unemployed, homemaker or student) or whether s/he is. Political affiliation 
is recorded, by three categorical indicators, right (those who report as being centre-right, 
right or extreme right wing), left (those who report as being centre-left, left or extreme left 
wing), and centre (those who are in the political centre, the baseline category). Type is the 
dummy variable representing the type of question administered, taking value 1 if the V 
variant was provided, and 0 if the P variant was administered. Regarding the identifying 
variables, single, divorced and widowed are three dummy variables representing whether 
the individual belongs to one of such marital status (as opposed to the omitted category 
married); and the binary variable rural, representing whether the individual is resident in a 
rural area (of less than 10,000 residents). For descriptive statistics, see Table 1.
3
 Although it would have been desirable to derive equivalent income, this has not been possible given the 
available information in the survey and also given that the household income was not available as a 
continuous variable.
Page 8 of 24
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
9
IV. RESULTS
Descriptive statistics and estimation results are reported in table 1. Overall, 69% of full 
respondents chose to target the egalitarian policy. Model [eq.1] passes the Reset 
specification test, indicating that there is no evidence of functional form problems (table 
2). In addition, when dealing with the issue of the relevance of the question variant in the 
model, likelihood ratio tests show that specification [eq.1] fits the data significantly better 
than other alternative specifications. The alternative equations considered include, on the 
one hand, a model that omits the type variable and, on the other hand, a model which 
includes the type variable together with interactions with the rest of independent variables. 
Therefore model [eq.1] shows that the way in which the question is presented counts, 
although there are no differential effects across the individual characteristics considered in 
the model.  Item non-response leads to 514 missing cases, which corresponds to 42.5% of 
the entire data, leaving 695 individuals as valid cases. Estimates for the probit with sample 
selection [eq.2] can be seen in table 4. The correlation coefficient (rho) is not statistically 
different from zero. It is also true that the confidence interval for the parameter estimate is 
wide. However, sign, magnitude and t-ratios of coefficients of the probit with selection are 
very similar to those of the initial probit estimation [eq.1].  Overall, the results suggest that 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no selection bias.
Probit average and marginal effects evaluated at sample means (table 3) show that: firstly, 
other things equal, age is a statistically significant explanatory variable of the probability 
to target the disadvantaged group. However, the marginal effect of age on targeting is not 
constant and changes with the age of the respondent. For young adults between 18 and 44 
the probability of targeting increases with age at a diminishing rate. A maximum is 
reached, on average, at the age of 44, after which the probability of targeting starts to 
decrease with age at an increasing rate. Interactions between age and income or education 
were omitted on statistical grounds, showing that there was not a differential effect of age 
through different income (or education) groups.
Secondly, the existing literature suggests that female respondents will have a higher 
preference towards egalitarian policies, and thus, that more women will target than men. 
However, respondent sex did not have any statistically significant impact on the 
propensity to target.  Thirdly, those who are politically right wing have a significantly 
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10
lower probability of targeting the egalitarian policy, as compared to those who are in the 
political centre (and consequently, as compared also to those who are left wing). In 
particular, the probability of a right wing individual targeting is on average 12% less than 
the reference individual, other things being equal. Finally, living in one of the richest 
regions such as Madrid, Navarra or País Vasco is associated with a lower probability of 
targeting the egalitarian policy, other things being equal, by 17.4%, compared to those 
living in average per capita income regions. There is no evidence that other demographic 
and socio-economic factors in the model have a significant influence in the attitudes 
towards health inequalities, including respondent sex. 
Regarding the effect of the question variants, our model suggests that mode of 
presentation does make a difference.  When individuals are administered the V-variant (as 
opposed to the P-variant), there is a 7% higher probability of targeting the egalitarian 
policy (at sample means). A comparison of this average effect with those of other 
variables shows that, at sample means, the average effect of the question variants is higher 
than that the marginal effect of age but lower than the average effect of being right wing 
or resident in a rich region. However, there is no evidence that the question variant has 
differential effects on the probability of targeting across the different demographic, socio-
economic and ideological characteristics, when these are taken jointly.
V. DISCUSSION
We found that a large majority of respondents (almost 70%) chose to target the egalitarian 
policy. This result, while interesting, should be interpreted with care and we discuss two 
points here. Firstly, we deliberately did not include efficiency issues in the question in 
order to isolate the equity issue alone. It may be the case that there is no reason to assume 
that, for instance, an extra $5 million put into program A would yield the same increase in 
health as the same expenditure in programme B and that, regardless of what the 
interviewers tell respondents, some of them would have made their own assumptions. In 
fact, the survey question of this study went on to identify the strength of inequality 
aversion by subjecting those respondents who choose the egalitarian policy to explicit 
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trade offs between efficiency and equality4. The results are discussed in a separate paper, 
but they suggest that the conclusions reached in this paper would not vary substantially if 
we had taken into account efficiency issues (for details, see Abasolo & Tsuchiya, 2004). 
Secondly, we must be aware that the proportion of those who chose to target might be 
inflated by two effects. A) What could be called a “gap in life expectancy effect”: in the 
question, the respondent is informed about current levels of health of both socioeconomic 
groups (70 vs 75 years). If this information had not been given to the respondent, we 
might have obtained a lower figure. Although this is an interesting issue that should 
deserve further research, it lies beyond the scope of this paper: the theoretical motivation 
behind the broader project that embraces the present piece of work was to estimate the 
inequality aversion parameter for a Health Related Social Welfare Function [Dolan, 1998], 
and therefore current levels of health needed to be explicit to the respondent. B) An 
“interviewer effect”: if respondents feel that their preferences are less egalitarian than 
what they perceive as socially acceptable, then they may find it awkward to be seen by the 
interviewer not caring to target the worse off, therefore inflating the proportion of those 
who choose to target. The study design does not allow any explorations of this possibility, 
but even if it was a significant problem, insofar as they are random with respect to the 
determinants that we explore in this paper, conclusions would not be affected.
It should be pointed out that the main aim of the paper is not to measure the propensity to 
target but rather to understand how this happens.  This is explored with reference to the 
predicted probability to target of a “standard Spaniard”: an individual who is of average 
age (45 years old) and belongs to the baseline categories of our dummy variables, that is, 
male, with middle income and education levels, who is in the labour market, politically 
centred, resident in a middle per capita income region and has been administered the P-
variant of the question. This standard Spaniard has a 68% predicted probability of 
choosing the targeting policy. That is, two thirds of those with our standard features would 
support that resources ought to be devoted to the lowest (and unhealthiest) socio-economic 
group. 
4
 Starting with the same question as the one presented in this paper, the respondents were asked four more 
questions in which they had to choose between the same programme A (which was invariant across the four 
of them) and a modified pro-poor programme B in which overall health was diminished progressively. The 
results show that the vast majority (90%) of respondents, who chose B in the very first question, kept on 
choosing B despite the loss in efficiency.
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The results suggest that age has a role when explaining this (see figure 1): at age 18, the 
predicted probability that the standard Spaniard targets is 56%. Starting from here, it 
increases with age, reaching the maximum probability of 69% at age 44, after which this 
probability diminishes with additional years. This predicted profile is symmetric with 
respect to age so that, for example, probabilities at age 24 (= 44 - 20) and at age 64 (= 44 + 
20) are both 61%.  The age at which the predicted probability of targeting is 50% is age 
74. The fact that the age effect was not different across income (or education) groups 
suggests that the targeting preference of those with below average income is not affected 
by their future prospects of income and social status, which contradicts the POUM 
hypothesis which will predict an interaction effect of age and income.
There are two possible explanations on why there may be an age effect on the propensity 
to target, both concerning the way age affects the way people interpret the concept “social 
class”.  The first explanation is based on “age” as a life stage.  To younger people, who are 
yet to establish their occupation or socio-economic status, the concept of social class may 
have less clear connotations than to older people whose occupation and socio-economic 
position is well established.  The second explanation is based on “age” as a proxy for 
cohorts.  In Spain, as in other modern societies, the concept of social class is becoming 
more and more obsolete in daily life, so that the younger generation may find it more 
difficult than the older generation to see the relevance of inequalities in health across the 
social classes.  Whilst these explanations fall short of justifying the age profile in Figure 1, 
they are consistent with a profile that is not a straight flat line.  Given the current cross 
sectional dataset, it is impossible to determine whether the effect of age is a life stage 
effect or a cohort effect, or a mixture of both.  
Those who are politically right wing have a significantly lower probability of choosing the 
egalitarian policy, as compared to those of the centre (and consequently as compared to 
those left wing). Therefore, if the standard Spaniard became right wing (other things 
remaining equal) this would reduce the probability of targeting by 13%. This is consistent 
with prior expectations, that egalitarianism is associated with left wing ideology rather 
than right wing. However, the estimated average effect might be overestimated if, as it 
seems, right wing people are more reluctant to explicitly indicate their political affiliation 
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in the background questions5. Finally, if a standard Spaniard was resident in one of the 
richest Regions like Madrid, Navarra or País Vasco (instead of living in a middle income 
Region) there would be, on average, a 18% lower probability of targeting the egalitarian
policy. Given the decentralised Spanish health care system, regional differences in the 
residents’ views towards health inequalities may be a matter of debate in the allocation of 
health care resources by regional health authorities. 
Of the other demographic and socio-economic factors with possible association with 
respondents’ propensity to target, none were statistically significantly associated. 
Particularly, respondent sex and socio-economic background (approximated by education 
and household income variables) does not seem to affect propensity to choose the 
egalitarian policy. Rather, health inequalities seem to be a matter of concern for the 
general population, irrespective of their income or education level. Taking into account 
that we are dealing with socio-economic inequalities in health, these results are not 
consistent with selfish motivations.  To the contrary, they seem to have picked up the 
respondents playing the role as citizens facing a policy rather than the role of consumers 
purchasing insurance policies, which was the intention of the questionnaire.  
The way in which the question is presented is associated with the probability of a given 
respondent choosing the egalitarian policy. People have a higher propensity to target when 
they deal with the verbal variant than when they face the pictorial variant.  A possible 
explanation for this is that the pictorial variant may have emphasised the gain more than 
the existing inequality.  As was discussed under the effect of respondent sex, contrary to 
the consequentialist economist’ conceptualisation, programme A, which gives equal 
amounts to both groups, might be perceived by the lay respondent as being more equal 
than programme B, which gives nothing to one group an all the benefits to the other.  The 
illustrated P-variant seems to be at a higher risk of this happening, because it visualises the 
differences across the two programmes in terms of what the two population groups will 
gain.  The current baseline inequality is the same across the two programmes, so they 
could be cancelled out from the cognitive process.  Should this happen, then those 
respondents who, had they been given the V-variant may have chosen to target, may well 
5
 Only 21% of individuals report that they are centre-right or right, whilst 47% of respondents report a 
centre-left or left ideology. In 1999, the Spanish Popular Party was in government (a centre-right party) and 
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choose not to target in the P-variant precisely because they regard themselves as 
egalitarian. Although the current data do not lead us to discriminate in favour of one 
particular mode of administration, we believe that this issue deserves more research in 
order to explore the reasons that lead people to choose differently under these two 
different formats.
It should also be noted that, despite this variant effect, the overall proportion of 
respondents who chose to target is roughly the same across the two questionnaire variants 
and the difference is not statistically significant (64% vs 69%). In certain research 
contexts, where the aim of the study is not to explain the variation in targeting behaviour 
by respondent background characteristics, this may be seen as sufficient justification to 
pool the data from the two variants.  
VI. CONCLUSION
The impact of demographic characteristics has been largely investigated in the literature as 
motivations on people’s attitudes over justice and rights in general and over income 
inequalities in particular. However, this has not been the case when we tackle attitudes 
towards redistributive or egalitarian policies in the health field. Stronger female traits 
towards solidarity observed in other areas was not observed in our example based on 
redistributive policies in health: respondent sex does not seem to have a significant impact 
when choosing egalitarian policies. On the other hand, results regarding respondent age 
suggest, in line with previous studies, changing levels of tolerance with aging towards 
socioeconomic health inequalities, but not lineally, so that younger and older individuals 
are significantly less likely to support egalitarian policies compared to middle age 
individuals. Analysis of other factors that have been controlled for show that right-wingers 
and/or those living in affluent regions are significantly less likely to support egalitarian 
policies; unexpectedly, other socioeconomic background characteristics such as 
individual’s education or household’s income do not seem to have a significant impact. 
The evidence also shows that the way in which the question is administered also counts: 
the regression results indicate that on average, there is a significantly higher probability to 
target when people deal with numbers rather than with pictures. 
the survey was undertaken just 3 months before general elections which the Popular Party won again with 
absolute majority.  
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OPTIONS PRESENTED IN THE PICTORIAL VERSION (P)
        High class          Low class                                      High class           Low class         
OPTIONS PRESENTED IN THE VERBAL VERSION (V)
Increase high class life expectancy in 2 years and low class life expectancy in 2 years. 
The final outcome of life expectancy would be:
  high class: 77 years
  low class: 72 years
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Increase only low class life expectancy. 
The final outcome of life expectancy would be:
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  low class: 74 years
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Figure 1: Probability of chosing the "egalitarian" option 
of a standard Spaniard; by respondent age
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TABLE 1. MEAN VALUES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES
VARIABLE      OBS.      MEAN     STD.DEV.    MIN   MAX
      Target      695     .6904674   .4626339      0      1
      Female      695      .485911   .5001614      0      1
         Age      695     45.26725    17.5467     18     91
       Agesq      695     2356.567   1709.339    324   8281
     Highedu      695     .2362348    .425074      0      1
      Midedu      695     .4139528    .492895      0      1
      Lowedu      695     .3498124    .477254      0      1
     Highinc      695     .2259842   .4185301      0      1
      Midinc      695     .4759503    .499781      0      1
      Lowinc      695     .2980655   .4577378      0      1
   Nonlabmkt      695     .5352979   .4991117      0      1
        Left      695     .4718532   .4995667      0      1
      Centre      695     .5377811   .4989296      0      1
       Right      695     .2190156   .4138771      0      1
     Reghigh      695     .1453269    .352684      0      1
      Regmid      695      .299272   .4582689      0      1
      Reglow      695      .223194   .4166872      0      1
        Type      695     .5006595   .5003597      0      1
      Single      695     .2614786   .4397565      0      1
    Divorced      695     .0256607   .1582349      0      1
     Married      695     .6236525   .4848178      0      1
     Widowed      695     .0892082   .2852493      0      1
       Rural      695     .2762375   .4474578      0      1
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TABLE 2. RESULTS PROBIT ESTIMATION
                                         Number of obs   =        695
                                         Wald chi2(13)   =      35.60
                                         Prob > chi2     =     0.0007
Log pseudo-likelihood = -410.96762       Pseudo R2       =     0.0443
             |               
  Target     Coef.   Std. Err.      z     P>|z|      [95% Conf.interval]
 female   .0356847   .1074363     0.33   0.740   -.1748865     .246256
 age      .0439998   .0174249     2.53   0.012     .0098476    .0781519
 agesq   -.0005051   .0001835    -2.75   0.006    -.0008647   -.0001455
 highedu  .2193948   .1350896     1.62   0.104    -.0453759    .4841655
 lowedu   .2170204   .1467326     1.48   0.139    -.0705703    .5046111
 lowinc   .0217484   .1364755     0.16   0.873    -.2457386    .2892355
 highinc -.1167251   .1337398    -0.87   0.383    -.3788504    .1454001
Nonlabmkt .1568169   .1254694     1.25   0.211    -.0890985    .4027324
 left    -.0148879   .1212119    -0.12   0.902    -.2524589    .2226831
 right   -.3359247   .1400621    -2.40   0.016    -.6104413    -.061408
 reghigh -.4672769   .1429565    -3.27   0.001    -.7474665   -.1870873
 reglow   .1271331   .131353      0.97   0.333    -.1303141    .3845803
 type     .2037721   .1025699     1.99   0.047     .0027387    .4048054
 cons    -.4742725   .4180061    -1.13   0.257    -1.293549    .3450044
RESET TEST 
. test targetf2=0
  chi2(  1)   =    0.30
  Prob > chi2 =    0.5835
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TABLE 3. PROBIT MARGINAL AND AVERAGE EFFECTS
                                              Number of obs =    695
                                              Wald chi2(13) =  35.60
               Prob > chi2   = 0.0007
Log pseudo-likelihood = -410.96762            Pseudo R2     = 0.0443
target      dF/dx   Std. Err.    z    P>|z|     x-bar       [95% C.I.]
female*   .0124443  .0374514    0.33   0.740  .485911  -.060959  .085848
age       .0153486  .0060819    2.53   0.012  45.2672   .003428  .027269
agesq    -.0001762  .000064    -2.75   0.006  2356.57  -.000302 -.000051
highedu*  .0740483  .0439303    1.62   0.104  .236235  -.012053   .16015
lowedu*   .0742953  .0491645    1.48   0.139  .349812  -.022065  .170656
highinc* -.041359   .0480767   -0.87   0.383  .225984  -.135588   .05287
lowinc*   .0075692  .0473876    0.16   0.873  .298065  -.085309  .100447
nonlab~t* .054818   .0438967    1.25   0.211  .535298  -.031218  .140854
left*    -.0051945  .042302    -0.12   0.902  .471853  -.088105  .077716
right*   -.1220372  .0525067   -2.40   0.016  .219016  -.224948 -.019126
reghigh* -.1738084  .0553471   -3.27   0.001  .145327  -.282287  -.06533
reglow*   .0434998  .0440084    0.97   0.333  .223194  -.042755  .129755
type*     .0709977  .0355512    1.99   0.047   .50066   .001319  .140677
obs. P    .6904674
pred.P    .6978101  (at x-bar)
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0
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TABLE 4. PROBIT WITH SAMPLE SELECTION
                                        Number of obs      =      1209
                                        Censored obs       =       514
                           Uncensored obs     =       695
                                        Wald chi2(13)      =     38.00
Log likelihood = -1205.962              Prob > chi2        =    0.0003
               Coef.     Std. Err.   z     P>|z|    [95% Conf. Interval]
target       
   female    .0057774   .1480517    0.04   0.969   -.2843986    .2959535
      age    .0489134   .0217279    2.25   0.024    .0063275    .0914993
    agesq   -.0005496    .000214   -2.57   0.010   -.0009691   -.0001302
  highedu    .2097602   .1384156    1.52   0.130   -.0615294    .4810498
   lowedu    .2111436   .1451737    1.45   0.146   -.0733917    .4956788
  highinc   -.1141935   .1327207   -0.86   0.390   -.3743213    .1459344
   lowinc    .0226788   .1338767    0.17   0.865   -.2397148    .2850724
nonlabmkt    .1352117   .1500073    0.90   0.367   -.1587973    .4292207
     left   -.0149317   .1195964   -0.12   0.901   -.2493362    .2194729
    right   -.3305266   .1424466   -2.32   0.020   -.6097169  -.0513364
  reghigh    -.534301   .2321364   -2.30   0.021   -.9892799    -.079322
   reglow    .1492482   .1469055    1.02   0.310   -.1386813    .4371778
     type    .2003553   .1029275    1.95   0.052   -.0013789    .4020895
     cons   -.7403945   .9407209   -0.79   0.431   -2.584174    1.103385
z            
   female   -.2007844   .0792574   -2.53   0.011    -.356126   -.0454427
      age    .0364361   .0136711    2.67   0.008    .0096411     .063231
    agesq   -.0003817   .0001372   -2.78   0.005   -.0006505   -.0001129
nonlabmkt   -.0980364    .088269   -1.11   0.267   -.2710405    .0749677
  reghigh   -.4232526   .0963924   -4.39   0.000   -.6121783   -.2343269
   reglow    .1806764   .0976276    1.85   0.064   -.0106701     .372023
  single   -.1022373   .1099509   -0.93   0.352    -.317737    .1132624
 divorced   -.1270649   .2394361   -0.53   0.596    -.596351    .3422211
  widowed    .2583478    .152567    1.69   0.090   -.0406781    .5573737
    rural    .1091552   .0928946    1.18   0.240   -.0729148    .2912253
    _cons   -.3541731   .3366173   -1.05   0.293   -1.013931    .3055846
   athrho    .2713856   .9422376    0.29   0.773   -1.575366    2.118137
      rho    .2649136    .876112                   -.9178751    .9714896
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.08   Prob > chi2 = 0.7742
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